

DEVELOPING A CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE
CAPABILITY

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

DEVELOPING A CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY, by MAJ Todd J. Clark, 82 pages.

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) requires that the military modify its methodology for conducting global operations. The military is transitioning from primarily lethal-focused offensive and defensive operations to full-spectrum operations that also include stability operations. The military must therefore address the need for personnel that can operate globally to accomplish missions. The contemporary areas of operation place United States (U.S.) military forces in foreign lands. The indigenous populations are now fully a component of the “battlefield” and interaction with indigenous populations is commonplace. The effect of cultural ignorance is directly linked to mission accomplishment. Therefore the military must improve its collective cultural capabilities to address this threat to military operations. The corporate and academic world also operates across established cultural boundaries. The stakes for these organizations are high as well. The solution is to address this issue through the development of cultural intelligence. Cultural intelligence is composed of two main aspects: cognitive intelligence (measured by Intelligence Quotient (IQ)) and Emotional Quotient (measured by Emotional Quotient (EQ)). The relative values of each are combined with one’s life experience to provide a measure of an individual’s Cultural Quotient (CQ). The military can address each component of CQ to develop its collective cultural intelligence. Raising the CQ of the U.S. military will facilitate success in the contemporary operating environment.

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ACRONYMS

COE	Contemporary Operating Environment
CQ	Cultural Quotient
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organizational, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities
EQ	Emotional Quotient
FAO	Foreign Area Officer
FM	Field Manual
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HTTs	Human Terrain Teams
IQ	Intelligence Quotient
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
I/Ts	Interpreter/Translators
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
ROTC	Reserve Officers Training Corps
U.S	United States

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Transformation has been interpreted as exclusively technological, but against an enemy who fights unconventionally . . . it is more important to understand motivation, intent, method, and culture than to have a few more meters of precision, knots of speed, or bits of bandwidth.

—Robert H. Scales, “Cultural Centric Warfare”

Background

The United States (U.S.) military’s ability to project its combat power to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT) also requires that it be capable of operating in diverse environments in which “commanders frequently identify an urgent need to understand local culture, politics, social structure, and economics” (McFate and Jackson 2005, 19).¹ Likewise, major corporate executives must also conduct dealings across international and cultural boundaries. To be successful, both require personnel that can bridge cultural gaps in distant unfamiliar lands to accomplish their missions because “working with different cultures requires sensitivity to cultural differences” (Rose 2007).

In general, some areas that must be known are: “an understanding of the social interaction norms of [a] culture . . . strategies that allow one to acquire such knowledge, as well as to form and maintain relationships . . . the desire and confidence to form relationships with individuals with different cultural background . . . [and] the appropriate behaviors that can put the other party at ease [in order to] build relationships more effectively” (Yee et al. 2005, 5-6). Thus cultural intelligence is necessary in order to succeed in foreign environments because “[r]elationships between different cultural and

linguistic groups are at the heart of diplomacy and the need to choose appropriate ambassadors of one group to another is as old as civilised [sic] societies” (Byram 1997, 1).

Cultural intelligence is defined as “being skilled and flexible about understanding a culture, learning increasingly more about it, and gradually shaping one’s thinking to be more sympathetic to the culture and one’s behavior to be more fine-tuned and appropriate when interacting with others from the culture” (Thomas and Inkson 2005, 7). The acquisition of cultural intelligence is not a prescribed or defined process. It is a perpetual non-sequential learning process through education and experience--combined with an individual’s abilities to absorb the needs of different environments--that allows one to not only know about other cultures, but to also develop the ability to understand those cultures. Understanding other cultures allows individuals to anticipate requirements, or take necessary actions, recognize minute cultural cues and facilitate communication, negotiation, and resolution. When applied to a more focused international relations perspective, the enhanced definition of cultural intelligence is the “analysis of social, political, economic, and other demographic information that provides understanding of a people or nation’s history, institutions, psychology, beliefs, and behaviours [sic]” (Yee et al. 2005, 4). Today’s conflicts in locations such as Iraq and Afghanistan demand that military forces must emphasize that “the host nation populations are the key terrain that we must secure in the global war on terrorism” (Wojdakowski 2007, 1).

The development of cultural intelligence can also promote better leadership skills as leaders develop a greater cognition of what their organizations must do to accomplish assigned missions. A critical component of leadership is the ability to motivate a diverse

group of people, both internal to an organization and increasingly interagency. The contemporary operating environment suggests that future conflicts will also require extensive interaction with other cultures and non-military international organizations, requiring that leaders develop their cultural competencies (Yee et al. 2005, 1). The same skills used to interact with foreign cultures can assist with daily intrapersonal relationships by fine-tuning the ability to intuitively react to diverse situations with different cultures and various individual personalities. Developing cultural intelligence requires that people learn to understand others. This results in leaders that can understand situations based on understanding populations.

Cultural intelligence also has the potential to facilitate interaction between organizations. Every organization composed of people has a unique “culture.” Unfortunately, people may subconsciously superimpose their own culture’s norms on other cultures, which may result in misunderstandings or worse (Rose 2007). The tendency of organizations to use successful practices with different organizations is not always acceptable. In fact, past attempts at “cookie cutter solutions” such as modeling the Army of the Republic of Vietnam on the Europe-based U.S. Army of the 1960s, proved completely inadequate for defeating the Communist forces. In fact, the basic inability of U.S. personnel to even understand the Vietnamese culture created severe impediments to the war’s prosecution. Modern examples of such mirror-imaging are the solipsistic attempt by the U.S. military to create a similar organization in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In reality, the needs, capabilities, and limitations of the fledgling ISF are far different than the long-established U.S. military. The problem is that leaders failed to identify the different requirements and limitations.

These seemingly futile attempts to build credible forces may have been avoided if leaders identified the foreign partner's needs. Clearly, forcing a solution upon an organization or culture is more difficult than finding a consensus. It requires that the party imposing its will be cognizant of the requirements and potential of the party to be affected. People that are capable of detecting cultural habits or leanings are more likely to assimilate and interact positively with another organizational culture. Likewise, an individual that appears to embrace an organization's culture is more likely to be successful in their dealings with that organization. Therefore proper inter-cultural understanding can lead to more effective dealings.

This is the importance of developing a cultural intelligence capability, where “[t]he need for cultural competence is triggered by situations characterized by joint destiny, where the stakes are high, and assumptions about how to achieve results vary greatly among key players” (Teachers College, Columbia University n.d.). Operating in a foreign culture requires understanding and compromise, and demands adaptation from an individual's or organization's traditional procedures. Individuals must always remember that the “sojourner . . . produces effects on a society which challenge its unquestioned and unconscious beliefs,” and that “behaviours and meanings are in turn challenged and expected to change” (Byram 1997, 1).

To mitigate the difficulties of cross-cultural operations, the ability of military forces to adapt to a new culture can minimize the degree to which “war [is] inherently unpredictable, uncertain, and ambiguous” (Murray 1997). In fact, “[as the military becomes] more knowledgeable of the local populations and their environment, [it becomes] increasingly adept at getting into . . . [the] adversary's decision cycle, [capable

of] interdicting his actions, and inflicting losses upon him faster than he can replace them with local resources” (Wojdakowski 2007, 1). Developing the skills required to accomplish this complex task is critical, and the need for “cultural and social knowledge has been increasingly recognized within the armed services” (McFate and Jackson 2005, 18). This thesis will fuse current discussions of the academic, corporate, and military establishments to determine a baseline understanding of the criticality of cultural intelligence.

Primary Research Question

This thesis seeks to answer “are there benefits for the U.S. military expending time and money to improve its collective Cultural Intelligence?” Clearly, different solutions yield varying degrees of success with varying outcomes. By examining methodology that is generally not “martial” in nature, it may provide revolutionary approaches to dealing with the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE). The thesis will also address the following questions in order to build a conclusion:

1. What are the benefits of cultural intelligence?
2. What should be the doctrinal approach to developing cultural intelligence?
3. What is the corporate approach to developing cultural awareness?
4. What lessons can the U.S. military learn from the corporate business and academic approaches to cultural intelligence?

Significance

The War on Terror brought changes to U.S. military doctrine to meet the requirements of irregular warfare. The ability to positively interact with indigenous

populations “has become so crucial that mission success is often significantly affected by soldiers’ ability [to engage local people and leaders]” (McFarland 2005, 62). It is clear that many of these changes are less revolutionary than re-embracing past lessons learned from other unconventional conflicts such as those in Vietnam, Algeria, or even the U.S. Great Plains (during the Indian Wars). Likewise, inventing a completely revolutionary approach to developing cultural intelligence may not be required given the corporate emphasis on international business dealings. While there is clearly an increased emphasis on “cultural awareness,” this may be only a component of what is truly required. There are few available empirical studies that identify what constitutes “cultural competence,” how “cultural competence” is to be developed, and how it is to be measured (Yee et al. 2005, 1-6).

Most parties do acknowledge the importance and potential impact of cultural competence on dealings in the international arena. The international community clearly benefits from peaceful and interactive coexistence. Likewise, mutual understanding serves to make it easier for the international population to interact and perhaps more easily achieve consensus. At the same time, being more aware of other cultures allows people to view their own through a different lens (Byram 1997, 2). At times, it is critical to “[listen] and [comprehend] the intent behind others’ remarks” (McFarland 2005, 65). The development of cultural intelligence promises to improve the ways that people work together.

Assumptions

The apparent lack of institutional military doctrine for developing cultural intelligence and wide-ranging corporate practices require that research be narrowed. In order to complete this study, it is necessary to make the following broad assumptions:

1. Corporate and academic concepts and practices are both applicable and acceptable for the U.S. military.

2. Current U.S. military doctrine does not specifically address “cultural intelligence.”

3. The U.S. military is a learning organization that is capable of embracing emerging trends in warfare.

Each assumption leads toward the efficacy of implementing new ways of thinking for operating in the COE. The U.S. military must broaden its tactics, techniques, and procedures beyond traditional Westphalian-type practices and institutionally adapt to all aspects of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME).

Definitions

Cultural Intelligence (Cultural Quotient (CQ)): A combination of IQ and EQ.

Intelligence Quotient (IQ): A measure of an individual’s intelligence.

Emotional Quotient (EQ): A measure of an individual’s emotional intelligence.

Limitations

The main limitation from the U.S. military standpoint is a lack of doctrine that specifically addresses “cultural intelligence” upon which to build. To address this void, there is some level of interpretation of concepts such as cultural awareness, cross-cultural communication, and foreign area knowledge. Therefore, some aspects of military doctrine along with published tactics, techniques, and procedures will be interpreted in order to develop a semblance of a doctrinal model. Likewise, there is no universal corporate and academic doctrine for developing cultural intelligence. The corporate and

academic realms offer many theories of which this thesis will take similarities and combine them for clarity's sake. Therefore, both corporate practices will be utilized to portray the "best practices" for developing cultural intelligence based on many models.

This thesis is not a complete doctrine, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis. A DOTMLPF analysis that is able to identify the capabilities required in each of these areas is required to determine feasibility of implementing changes to existing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for further development of cultural intelligence in the U.S. military. This thesis does not attempt to synchronize any capabilities or mitigate limitations (U.S. Army 2007, F102AA-3).

Delimitations

This thesis will not address organizational structures, proposed educational institutions, nor specific curricula for addressing U.S. military cultural awareness development. The purpose of this study is rather to identify key attributes of cultural awareness in order to facilitate potential future implements. The sheer magnitude of proposing such institutions would be best addressed by further independent study. However, by addressing key tenets of cultural awareness from the military, corporate, and academic arenas, the intent of this thesis is to identify a fusion of the best practices from each discipline and apply these principles to military personnel.

¹The authors expound on this concept on page 20, wherein they state that commanders would benefit greatly from the ability to "identify legitimate leaders and the interests of the population in the area in question; ethno-religious, class, and tribal groups; and help develop courses of action for institution building and economic development, among other things."

CHAPTER 2

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

Modern military forces have been transforming and re-organising to adopt new roles in a wide spectrum of operations involving both conventional warfighting operations and operations other than war (OOTW). Among the new competencies identified for leadership in the new operating environment is “cultural awareness” or “cultural competence.”

—Yee et al. 2005

Literature Review

The U.S. military has made a significant effort to include cultural awareness education into doctrine. The military’s tendency to embrace the concept of cultural understanding is apparent with the introduction of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, in 2006. This document addresses the importance of understanding indigenous cultures in defeating insurgencies. While the importance of culture is clearly recognized, the doctrine does not provide a holistic process to fully embrace organizational competencies in developing a complete cultural intelligence capability.

Until recently, U.S. military doctrine focused on two lethal types of operations-- offense and defense. The recently published U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, introduces a third equally important type of operation: stability. Stability operations imply that interaction with indigenous populations is to be expected. Soldiers and leaders at all levels must have some knowledge of the environment in which they will operate; leaders in particular must have detailed knowledge so that they can make key decisions that affect their mission’s outcome (Yee, et al. 2005, 9). In order to adequately prepare for these operations, “[the military must] treat learning knowledge of

culture and developing language skills as seriously as we treat learning combat skills: both are needed for success in achieving U.S. political and military objectives” (Department of Defense 2004, xii).

With the equalization of offense, defense, and stability operations, knowledge of culture is an increasing requirement for military forces projecting the national will (Department of Defense 2004, xii). The military trained intensely for the “conventional” offense and defense missions throughout the 20th Century. The military fully understood the requirements for intense force-on-force operations and toiled endlessly to develop applicable doctrine to defeat enemy armed forces. However, military doctrine is non-descript when addressing cultural awareness although it acknowledges that “cultural factors are part of the battlefield” and we must “[include] them in our training, planning, and operations [to ensure] that in winning the war we will secure a lasting peace” (Wojdakowski 2007, 1). The most visible attempt to develop such cultural knowledge is through pre-deployment training sessions that feature Powerpoint presentations, often instructed by non-experts. The institutional military continues its struggle to adapt to the broad spectrum of contemporary DIME-focused operations.

It is very difficult to find a useful doctrinal definition of “cultural awareness,” although the term is used widely in military circles. In general, cultural awareness may be defined as the “cognizance of cultural terrain for military operations and the connections between culture and warfighting . . . [of which the] awareness connotes an understanding that cultural terrain must be considered for military operations, a knowledge of which cultural factors are important for a given situation and why, and a

specified level of understanding for a target culture” (U.S. Marine Corps n.d.). Clearly the military acknowledges the importance of culture in operations. Or does it?

In fact there are numerous suggestions that the U.S. military continues to perform poorly in the realm of cultural intelligence. One such indication is provided by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in a 2006 report. “Cultural Intelligence and the United States Military” points out that the armed forces lack “cultural awareness and [have failed] to institutionalize cultural awareness as part of . . . doctrine and training” (Center for Advanced Defense Studies 2006). This failure to adapt is not new:

[The United States] marched into the Vietnam War with . . . an incredible ignorance. Americans had scant knowledge of the language, culture, traditions, and history of the people on whose behalf the [U.S.] was intervening . . . nor did the civilian leadership at the Pentagon nor the professional military even [desire] such knowledge. (Murray 1997)

The foremost realization before committing U.S. military forces into foreign countries is that expeditionary personnel are visitors to foreign lands. Indigenous populations will make assumptions on these personnel; the potential is for U.S. forces to be viewed as anything between “liberator” and “occupier.” In many countries, the existing social groups are the main source of security and stability. Furthermore these structures developed specifically for this purpose and serve as a main provider of normalcy; some of these groups even pre-date the United States. “Visiting” entities must, therefore, strive to assimilate as much as possible while still addressing the requirements of the mission (Byram 1997, 2). Understanding the nuances of different cultures is critical to achieving some level of agreement.

Based on the contemporary operating environment’s demands, some suggest that military personnel “be given cross-cultural education including language and cross

cultural skills” for them to “develop cultural sensitivity to a variety of cultures.” The methodology includes a 5-stage model to progress from “non-transcultural” to “transcultural:” Adventurer, Sensitizer, Insider, Judge, and Synthesizer (Yee et al. 2005, 2). This perpetual development process follows a “crawl-walk-run” approach that allows basic principles to be continually built upon.

Many academic and corporate theorists have embraced the necessity of fully developing cultural intelligence (CQ). In fact, the “Harvard Business Review [deemed CQ] as the ‘essential factor of our times’ without which, ‘NO one is going to be even remotely successful’ [in the 21st century]” (Abbot 2008). The majority of these studies show that the three primary components to cultural intelligence are: intelligence quotient (IQ), emotional intelligence quotient (EQ), and the resultant combination of personal experiences (see figure 1).




Figure 1. Linkage of IQ+EQ+CQ

Source: P. Christopher Earley and Elaine Mosakowski, "Cultural Intelligence," *Harvard Business Review* (October 1, 2004), http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.edu/b02/en/common/item_detail.jhtml;jsessionid=GY0WRWJFXSSH4AKRGWCB5VQBKE0YOISW?id=R0410J&referral=2340 (accessed April 23, 2008).

The work of David C. Thomas and Kerr Inkson in "Cultural Intelligence: People Skills for the Global Workplace" is a representative sample of publications concerning cultural intelligence. They describe the unique skills and flexibility necessary to succeed in high-stakes global business dealings. The authors proceed to delineate stages to developing cultural awareness, although they acknowledge that it is a perpetual process that is never final. Key to all are the assessment and development of both IQ and EQ in order to develop the CQ required for successful international endeavors.

Cross-cultural competence is closely related to cultural intelligence. This is the ability of an individual to interact with other cultures. An individual seeking this competence must possess the following:

1. Relational-Building and Maintenance Competence: associated with the establishment and maintenance of “positive” relationships.
2. Information Transfer Competence: associated with the transmission of information with minimum loss and distortion.
3. Compliance-Gaining Competence: associated with persuasion and securing an appropriate level of compliance and / or cooperation (Byram 1997, 14-15).

The United States military must adapt to the requirements of globalization. Current employment of military personnel minimizes further development of “[l]anguage skill and regional expertise . . . as Defense core competencies,” and are only starting to realize that “they are as important as critical weapons systems” (McFate and Jackson 2005, 18). Increased interaction with coalitions, international non-governmental organizations, indigenous populations, and international media demands a culturally attuned dimension to campaigning:

What we will need in the [21st century] is a deeper understanding of the political context of war and the very different set of assumptions that our opponents may bring to it. We will require knowledge of foreign languages, cultures, religious beliefs, and above all history (Murray 1997).

The missed opportunities to improve cultural intelligence are also evident in the contemporary operating environment. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops have deployed globally. Each individual presumably developed specific cultural knowledge

peculiar to their assigned area of operations. Even if each individual only developed one iota of cultural understanding that was not previously present, it is a crucial step in achieving cultural intelligence. Such knowledge must be both retained by the individual and shared with others (see table 1).

Table 1. Comparing Cultural Norms and Values

Aspects of Culture	Mainstream American Culture	Other Cultures
Sense of self and space	Informal, handshake	Formal hugs, bows, handshakes
Communication and language	Explicit, direct communication; emphasis on content, meaning found in words	Implicit, indirect communication; emphasis on context, meaning found around words
Dress and appearance	“Dress for success” ideal; wide range in accepted dress	Dress seen as a sign of position, wealth, and prestige; religious rules
Food and eating habits	Eating as a necessity, fast food	Dining as a social experience; religious rules
Time and time consciousness	Linear and exact time consciousness; value on promptness, time equals money	Elastic and relative time consciousness; time spent on enjoyment of relationships
Relationships, family, friends	Focus on nuclear family; responsibility for self; value on youth; age seen as handicap	Focus on extended family; loyalty and responsibility to family; age given status and respect
Values and norms	Individual orientation; independence; preference for direct confrontation of conflict	Group orientation; conformity; preference for harmony
Beliefs and attitudes	Egalitarian; challenging of authority; individuals control their destiny; gender equality	Hierarchical; respect for authority and social order; individuals accept their destiny; different roles for men and women
Mental processes and learning style	Linear, logical, sequential problem-solving focus	Lateral, holistic, simultaneous; accepting of life’s difficulties
Work habits and practices	Emphasis on task; reward based on individual achievement; work has intrinsic value	Emphasis on relationships; rewards based on seniority, relationships; work is a necessity of life

Source: Maxie McFarland, “Military Cultural Education,” *Military Review* (March-April 2005): 65.

Rather than embracing this developing capability and continuing its cultivation, there is no continuity in deploying individuals to areas that they have grown accustomed

to. Continuing a regional or theater orientation to operational deployments allows individuals to build their competencies. Individuals are routinely transferred throughout the military with minimum attention to where they may provide the most impact based on area expertise. This erodes institutional cultural intelligence.

The current solution to lack of military cultural expertise is the fielding of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs). The teams deploy with units as cultural advisors and analysts that perform the following tasks:

1. Conduct cultural preparation of the environment.
2. Integrate human terrain into the Military Decision Making Process.
3. Provide human terrain support to current operations.
4. Evaluate human terrain effects.
5. Train support elements in relevant socio-cultural issues (Human Terrain System 2008).

These teams provide the commander with access to knowledge by both providing experts in various academic disciplines and facilitating “reach back” capabilities to minimize knowledge gaps. Teams are composed of military personnel, academics, and social scientists that are assigned to military units to provide the interpretation of cultural situations that help military personnel make sound decisions (Pryor 2007).

Unfortunately, this level of socio-cultural knowledge is only available at the brigade-level and above. Lower echelon units must often focus on more local sources such as locally-hired interpreter/translators (I/Ts) for their cultural considerations, although there is interest in fielding these teams to lower-level echelons.

Local-national interpreters are the most available force multipliers that offer military forces access to cultural expertise. However, these individuals are an unknown entity since their allegiance is never assured. They may provide situational interpretations prejudicial to U.S. needs, for personal gain, or simply according to what the individual I/T believes that the U.S. unit wants to hear. Similar to relying heavily on local-national interpreters, culturally ignorant forces may over-rely on local-national contractors lacking security clearances (Porter n.d., 1-2). Both of these prevalent resources lead U.S. forces to use potentially non-credible sources to make crucial decisions.

Corporations realized the criticality of multi-cultural capabilities decades ago. The dealings of profit-oriented organizations necessitated that they either aggressively pursue inter-cultural competence or face failure in the international marketplace. The corporate world identified the following:

Success in the expatriate literature has generally been argued to include the following criteria: work adjustment, interaction with host nationals, and adjustment to the general living conditions. [The required skills may be] clustered into nine broad cross-cultural competencies. They are building relationships, valuing people of different cultures, listening and observation, coping with ambiguity, translating complex information, taking action and initiative, managing others, adaptability / flexibility, and managing stress. (Yee et al. 2005, 4)

There is a need to field educated and loyal individuals who are able to operate in different cultures and their ways of thinking; “what matters most in war is what is in the mind of one’s adversary” (Murray 1997). Aside from adversaries, it is necessary for commanders to understand social aspects and attitudes to assist in the development of goals and priorities (Department of Defense 2004, 12-13). They must develop the ability to understand--and anticipate--another culture’s thought process. The military must

therefore identify those personnel that have high levels of cultural intelligence so that they can be employed. In order to identify these personnel, the elements of CQ must be understood.

Intelligence Quotient

The Intelligence Quotient “stands as a proxy for the cognitive complexity a person can process” (Goleman 2008). Individual IQ is generally measured by a cultural-based multiple choice test that determines aptitudes in aspects of various mental abilities such as verbal, mathematical, spatial, visualization, classification, logic, and pattern recognition (IQ Test Labs). IQ is important in the development of CQ because individuals must be capable of gaining knowledge in academic and technical subject areas. If an individual is significantly IQ-challenged, then the potential for them to learn complex subjects is diminished. The IQ test provides a measure of an individual’s intellectual abilities and sample questions for an IQ test are shown in figure 2.


1. Rearrange the following letters to make a word and choose the category in which it fits: RAPETKA

- A. city
- B. fruit
- C. bird
- D. vegetable

2. Which number should come next in this series: 3,5,8,13,21, ?

- A. 4
- B. 21
- C. 31
- D. 34

3. Which of the cubes is the same as the unfolded cube below?



A



B



C



D

4. Which figure is the odd one out?



A

B


C

D

5. Which number does not belong in the following sequence: 1, 4, 9, 15, 16, 25

6. At the end of a banquet 10 people shake hands with each other. How many handshakes will there be in total?

7. Which of the diagrams follows?



A

B

C

D

Figure 2. Sample IQ Test Questions

Source: IQ Test Labs, "Sample Personalized IQ Report," *Discover Your Intellectual Strengths*, <http://www.intelligencetest.com/report/analysis.htm> (accessed August 5, 2008).

Emotional Quotient

Emotional intelligence, which is sometime referred to as “emotional IQ,” is “a cluster of personal and social competencies that include self-awareness and control, motivation and persistence, empathy, and [the] ability to form relationships” (McCollum and Broadus 2007, 171). The EQ is a personal attribute that is highly impacted by life experiences. An individual’s EQ is indicative of how they interact with others and their capability to understand themselves. This attribute can help to identify an individual’s capacity to interact with others and adjust behavior based on situational needs. An individual must be able to identify nuances in others because “[l]ike and iceberg, some aspects of culture are visible; others are beneath the surface. Invisible aspects influence and cause visible ones” (McFarland 2005, 63). Measurement of an individual’s EQ is achieved through a standardized test; a sample test is included in figure 3.

Most EQ tests resemble this representative sample. Additional information that may be included in formulating an individual’s EQ include: occupation, salary, age, and gender. These tests are indicative of an individual’s ability to address diversity, adjust behavior as required, and recognize changing environments. There is no indication that ethnicity influences this measure.

1. I stay relaxed and composed under pressure.
2. I can identify negative feelings without becoming distressed.
3. I stay focused (not lost in unimportant details or procrastination) in getting a job done.
4. I freely admit to making mistakes.
5. I am sensitive to other people's emotions and moods.
6. I can receive feedback or criticism without becoming defensive.
7. I calm myself quickly when I get angry or upset.
8. I communicate my needs and feelings honestly.
9. I can pull myself together quickly after a setback.
10. I am aware of how my behavior impacts others.
11. I pay attention & listen without jumping to conclusions.
12. I take regular time out (once a month/quarter) to reflect on my core purpose and vision for how I want to live my life.
13. I know where I stand with my manager.
14. I don't think my [boss] truly knows how he/she impacts me.
15. I feel like my manager does not understand what I value.
16. I do not feel understood by members of different generations.

Figure 3. Sample EQ Test Questions.

Source: Institute for Health and Human Potential, *Test Your EQ*, <http://www.ihhp.com/quiz.php> (accessed April 23, 2008).

Significance of Intelligence Quotient and Emotional Quotient

Individuals must possess appropriate levels of both IQ and EQ in order to achieve an appreciable amount of CQ. Therefore, the two are not mutually exclusive when determining an individual's CQ. While IQ may be an initial determinant for which job an individual may perform, EQ may determine their longevity in the job based on their adaptation to various environments or interactions with peers or superiors (Goleman 2008).

Similar to both IQ and CQ, an individual's cultural intelligence may be rudimentarily measured by a test. The result of the test is identified as an individual's "cultural quotient" (CQ). The following is a sampling of a generic CQ test (see figure 4).

Cultural intelligence is considered a basic management skill for corporate leaders (Thomas and Inkson 2005, 5). Like hunting, cultural intelligence cannot be spontaneously conceived. Rather, it must be arduously developed through studies and experience in "language, society, customs, economy, religion, history, and many other factors" of a particular culture (Center for Advanced Defense Studies 2006). The corporate world has recently devoted significant attention to developing such cultural intelligence amongst its multi-national personnel as a means to increase productivity, hence, profitability.

The main building block for cultural intelligence is cultural awareness, where "all aspects of a nation's *cultural arc*--its past, present and future," are understood (Center for Advanced Defense Studies 2006). Cultural awareness may be developed through academic research, field experiences, or a combination of both. Although even established stereotypes may be appropriate building blocks to anticipate culturally-based behavior, "experiential learning is key to increasing CQ"¹ (Thomas and Inkson 2005, 5-6). Basically, the individual's life experiences teach them to detect nuances between their life experiences and others'. Individuals must develop the ability to identify subtle signs or gestures that may contain messages. Finally, the ability to integrate the knowledge gained from academic study and observation into one's own behavior denotes cultural intelligence² (Thomas and Inkson 2005, 7).

The 20-item four factor CQS (the CQ Scale)									
CQ-Strategy		Strongly DISAGREE				Strongly AGREE			
MC1	I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I use when interacting with people with different cultural backgrounds.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
MC2	I adjust my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from a culture that is unfamiliar to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
MC3	I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I apply to cross-cultural interactions.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
MC4	I check the accuracy of my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from different cultures.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
CQ-Knowledge									
COG1	I know the legal and economic systems of other cultures.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
COG2	I know the rules (e.g., vocabulary, grammar) of other languages.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
COG3	I know the cultural values and religious beliefs of other cultures.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
COG4	I know the marriage systems of other cultures.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
COG5	I know the arts and crafts of other cultures.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
COG6	I know the rules for expressing non-verbal behaviors in other cultures.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
CQ-Motivation									
MOT1	I enjoy interacting with people from different cultures.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
MOT2	I am confident that I can socialize with locals in a culture that is unfamiliar to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
MOT3	I am sure I can deal with the stresses of adjusting to a culture that is new to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
MOT4	I enjoy living in cultures that are unfamiliar to me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
MOT5	I am confident that I can get used to the shopping conditions in a different culture.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
CQ-Behavior									
BEH1	I change my verbal behavior (e.g., accent, tone) when a cross-cultural interaction requires it.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
BEH2	I use pause and silence differently to suit different cross-cultural situations.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
BEH3	I vary the rate of my speaking when a cross-cultural situation requires it.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
BEH4	I change my non-verbal behavior when a cross-cultural situation requires it.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
BEH5	I alter my facial expressions when a cross-cultural interaction requires it.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

Figure 4. Sample CQ Test

Source: Cultural Intelligence Center, *The 20-item Four Factor CQS (the CQ Scale)*, 2005, <http://culturalq.com/images/thecqs.pdf> (accessed July 28, 2008).

The development of cultural intelligence is a perpetual process in which one milestone is reached, while others become more apparent over time. The ambiguity involved with operating in alien cultures necessitates that culturally intelligent individuals are:

skilled and flexible about understanding a culture, learning increasingly more about it, and gradually [shape their] thinking to be more sympathetic to the culture and [their] behavior to more fine-tuned and appropriate when interacting with others from the culture. (Thomas and Inkson 2005, 7)

Thomas identifies Proteus, a supernatural being in Homer's *Odyssey*, as the epitome of cultural intelligence. Proteus could transform his appearance at will to appease whomever he was dealing with based on his knowledge and situational awareness. This must encompass both "*tangible* characteristics, such as physical appearance, clothing, architecture, gestures, pace of life, sports and diet, or *attitudinal* characteristics, such as tolerance to change, notions of time and space, societal roles, communications styles, convictions, beliefs, values and behaviors through which experience is interpreted and carried out" (Thomas and Inkson 2005, 7-8). According to Thomas, there are five stages to developing cultural intelligence, which are identified in table 2.

Clearly, the goal to strive for in developing a cultural intelligence specialist is Thomas' "Level 5." While admittedly difficult, the ability to develop cultural intelligence is within reach. Developing general consistencies of a culture's "key cultural characteristics, regional or organizational variations, religious / tribal / ethnic differences, [or] protocol" are well-documented and useful tools. Unfortunately, some of the most useful tools such as "expected behavior, detailed customs, speech inflections, expressions, and actions that may be considered offensive" are far more difficult to learn without literal exposure to the culture over an extended period of time.

Table 2. Five Stages to Developing Cultural Intelligence

Stage	Description	Comments
1	REACTIVITY to external stimuli.	In this stage, individuals with minimal exposure to foreign cultures typically adhere strictly to their own “cultural rules and norms.” The individual may not even recognize the differences between the cultures.
2	RECOGNITION of other cultural norms and motivation to learn more about them.	At this point, the individual’s interest increases, but he is often overwhelmed by the many variances between his native culture and the newly introduced one.
3	ACCOMMODATION of other cultural norms and rules.	The norms and rules become more understandable and even reasonable. In fact, the individual becomes comfortable enough to react appropriately to cultural situations; they become cognizant of what to do, and when to do it, although it is still very much a conscious action that feels somewhat uncomfortable.
4	ASSIMILATION of diverse cultural norms into alternative behaviors.	Individual can function socially and draw upon many behaviors almost effortlessly. In addition, local cultures become accepting of the individual and willingly include him in activities based on grasp of cultural knowledge.
5	PROACTIVITY in cultural behavior based on recognition of changing cues that others do not perceive.	The individual can sense “changes in the cultural context,” perhaps even before natives. Behavior is automatically adjusted, as compared to a conscious action. Required behaviors and their execution become intuitive.

Source: Thomas, David C., and Kerr Inkson, “Cultural Intelligence: People Skills for a Global Workplace,” *Consulting to Management* 16, no. 1 (March 2005): 7-8.

Attaining this “5th level” of cultural awareness must be actively pursued in order to develop a Cultural Intelligence capability: “the ability to engage in a set of behaviors that use language, interpersonal skills and qualities appropriately tuned to the culture-

based values and attitudes of the people with whom one interacts” (Center for Advanced Defense Studies 2006). In the case of military personnel whose primary duty is to fight and win the nation’s wars, this may be a far-fetched goal. However, the point is that each level must be actively pursued. Whether the final level is ever achieved is not as important as the attempt to achieve it.

Global business depends on successful interactions and negotiations between different cultures. Globalization has broadened the workplace beyond established national borders or traditional international boundaries. Developing the means to embrace and address globalization forced corporations to reconsider established practices in order for businesses to expand. While one era witnessed urban centers growing to facilitate trade, the contemporary world has corporations with offices in many different countries servicing a global market. Therefore, corporate leaders needed to learn how to deal with other cultures to be successful in the global marketplace. At a minimum, understanding another party’s point of view may allow the achievement of mutually beneficial dealings in accordance with Homan’s Theorem.

Agreements may be reached by compromising on each single issue or by trading concessions on one issue for “exchanging points” by the other side on another. Homan's Theorem states that the more the items at stake can be divided into goods valued more by one party than they cost to the other, and goods valued more by the other party than they cost to the first, the greater the chances of successful outcomes (CERTI Website).

The military also operates across national, cultural, and ethnic boundaries. Indeed, such boundaries are increasingly ambiguous in many areas of conflict. The roles played by not only international non-state actors, but even regional groups within

national borders, require that the U.S. military be capable of operating in environments with many diverse cultural characteristics. Unfortunately, recent history shows that early in the Iraq occupation “cultural isolation . . . created a tragic barrier separating Iraqis of goodwill from the inherent goodness of U.S. soldiers” (Scales 2004). This separation became a barrier between potential allies within the Iraqi population and the occupying U.S. forces. While the popular U.S. opinion from within the safety of blast walls had normalcy and stability returning to Iraq, the Iraqi people did not even have the most basic of human needs as identified by Abraham Maslow in 1943 (Maslow 2007). It seems that the U.S. forces failed to identify, embrace, and address the most basic of priorities.



Figure 5. Maslow's Hierarchy of Human Needs.

Source: Mount Holyoke College Website, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~mlyount/MySites/Pictures/hierarchy.JPG> (accessed October 20, 2008).

In many instances, success depends as much on the perception of the population towards foreign military forces or actors as on the application of traditional military might. It is critical for foreign forces to understand the needs of the population to build the necessary relationship. The U.S. military was collectively culturally illiterate because it did not “understand and appreciate [its] own beliefs, behaviors, values, and norms” and was not “aware of how [its] perspectives might affect [the Iraqi culture’s] views” (McFarland 2005, 63). The ability to “see ourselves” allows us to better understand the needs of others. Failing to address local needs and requirements creates a barrier. The barrier degrades trust and can lead to conflict. The current situation in Iraq might have been far different if U.S. forces identified the importance of identifying and fulfilling the needs of the Iraqi people.

Therein lies the correlation between corporate dealings and military operations. Both represent potential high stakes environments where the outcome is largely dependent on adroit cultural maneuvering. Businesses stand to gain or lose millions of dollars based on the receptivity of the customer to the seller. In military operations, the potential gains or losses is measured in the lives of service members. Whereas the corporate world rapidly adjusted to the requirements to not only operate, but to *flourish* in foreign environments, the U.S. military’s approach was more incremental and slower. Likewise, academic studies of the theories involving cultural intelligence assist developing pertinent models. The application of the primarily-civilian concepts promises to achieve the goal of creating increased cultural intelligence in military professionals. The potential to merge CQ popular theories with the military culture is apparent.

Rapid adjustment to contemporary needs is critical for operating across international and cultural lines. The deployment capabilities and subsequent combat operations by the U.S. military is unequalled. The standard approach to preparing a combat unit for deployment to a foreign area is to focus heavily on tactical skills and operations, only with only a rudimental focus on *some* “softer” areas such as local language, customs, religions, history, and other more “social studies” subjects. Units typically conduct some level of training in cultural awareness. Cultural awareness is intended to “instill in deployed forces an awareness of societal and cultural norms for the regions in which they will operate” (McFarland 2005, 62). However, there is minimal attention to the *local* indigenous population or “any in-depth study of culture” (Yee et al. 2005, 2). While clearly better than no cultural preparation, “they fall far short of generating the tactile understanding necessary for today’s complex settings, especially when values and norms are so divergent [that] they clash” (McFarland 2005, 62). Sometimes this training may even be oriented towards a larger culture such as “Arabs” rather than “Iraqi,” or may attempt to superimpose similar--yet significantly different--cultural models on neighboring areas (such as Egyptian culture and values rather than those of Iraq).

Much of this training is specifically oriented towards facilitating a commander’s mission accomplishment at the tactical level. This often ad hoc training may include focus on the following areas:

1. the history of the local area (country), and the origins of conflicts
2. components of culture, values, traditions, and beliefs in the area [sp] (religion, education, and economic activity)

3. language training
4. physical geography, climate, topography, economic patterns
5. cultural personality including education, family size, ethics and values
6. study of anthropology of the other countries
7. understanding cultural differences--knowing how one's own culture affects someone else's culture can affect the mission's chance of success
8. educating soldiers and leaders on foundational cultural norms and values and teaching them skills used to understand and bridge cultural differences (Yee et al. 2005, 2-3).

The training is normally brief in comparison to other activities (although admittedly more emphasized now than in the early stages of the GWOT) (Weil 2004). Unfortunately, cultural awareness training is treated as a training task to be completed rather than an educational subject to be taught. Therefore, the individuals become somewhat familiar to cultural concepts rather than true knowledge. However, "cultural competence cannot be developed overnight through pre-departure training" (Yee et al. 2005, 2).

Cultural intelligence allows organizations to develop influence with potential partners or customers, and understand both cultural differences and how they influence actions. From a military standpoint, cultural intelligence can facilitate the analysis of enemy actions (Thomas and Inkson 2005, 6). This, in concept, may not be entirely different from files developed on the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, wherein cultural tendencies allowed possible anticipation of future actions during combat. Although clearly there was also study of anticipated actions by the Warsaw Pact as a whole, the ability to focus on particular components of the communist bloc allowed a more in-depth

understanding of both the enemy and potential collaborators. In the case of the GWOT, anti-terrorism forces must anticipate the actions of many cultures rather than a dedicated alliance³ (Thomas and Inkson 2005, 6). In fact, “[c]ultural information is critical to gauge the potential reactions to the operation, to avoid misunderstandings, and to improve the effectiveness of the operations” (U.S. Army 2008). Because of this, it is unlikely that a large body of specific cultural intelligentsia can be developed and maintained to address the entire global arena. However, it is possible to develop a body targeted toward specific areas for necessary timeframes.

People are the heart of a cultural intelligence capability and are required to “make connections between seemingly disparate pieces of information” (Thomas and Inkson 2005, 8). The Cold War serves as an example of penetrating closed societies because the major powers were able to co-opt operatives within the enemy societies. However, this represented espionage in a more “conventional” environment with conflict between nations. Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency require dealing with both nations and non-state actors.

In the past, international and regional powers--such as the Israelis and British--were able to develop these capabilities from within their indigenous populations, but it is extremely unlikely for the U.S. to exclusively use Americans to penetrate terrorist or insurgent organizations. In fact, studies of the Iraqi insurgency reveal instances of “cultural encryption used by insurgents in their rhetoric” (Center for Advanced Defense Studies 2006). The leadership of al-Qaeda clearly is aware of the leanings and teachings of Islam and are able to address the populations in several ways. The binding tie is the Koran, which purports a universal message to all Moslems. The transmission of both

verbal and non-verbal cues--and our inability to identify them--represents the cultural gap that must be overcome in order to defeat such enemies.

Effective communication is always a primary concern when operating across cultural boundaries. Building the necessary relationship may entail “develop[ing] skills for cross-cultural communications and understand[ing] that communication and trust are often more important than action” (McFarland 2005, 62-69). In many cases, the impact is not realized in “what is said” but rather in “how it is said.” It is critical to understand how communications will be “perceived and interpreted” in various cultural contexts (Byram 1997, 3).

The military must understand its foe because “the enemy’s motives often remain a mystery, and the cost in casualties of [the inability] the enemy and predict his actions [is] too great” (Scales 2004). Therefore, it is necessary to develop increasingly creative means to become culturally intelligent. Thomas describes the following “rules of engagement” when dealing with a different culture:

1. Become knowledgeable about your own culture and background, its biases and idiosyncrasies, and the way this is unconsciously reflected in your own perceptions and behavior.
2. Deliberately increase mindfulness by expecting differences in others. View different behavior as novel rather than strange, and suspend judgment of it.
3. Be attentive to behavioral cues and their possible interpretations, and to the likely effect of your behavior on others.
4. Adapt your behavior in ways that you are comfortable with that are also appropriate for new situations.

5. Be mindful of responses to your behavioral adaptation.
6. Experiment with methods of adapting intuitively to new situations, and build your comfort level in acquiring a repertoire of new behavior.
7. Practice new behaviors that work, until they become automatic.

Researching the corporate world's attempt to develop individuals that are "culturally intelligent" may serve as a framework to develop this capability within the Department of Defense intelligence community. This endeavor must be viewed as a "complicated pursuit in anthropology, psychology, communications, sociology, history and . . . military doctrine" (Center for Advanced Defense Studies 2006). While difficult to develop, "the confidence and control that comes with cultural intelligence is well worth the effort" (Thomas and Inkson 2005, 9). The development of a true cultural intelligence capability can facilitate victory and potentially limit the duration and level of violence of modern warfare.

While significant exertion has been made to improve organizational cultural intelligence, there are trends in the shortcomings of these efforts. The attempt to find a solution that may be applied universally has resulted in the following:

existing approaches tend to provide a "cafeteria" style of education by offering different training methodologies without having a conceptual framework that links these methodologies to the trainees strengths and weaknesses [most approaches] focus on cognitive training such as country-specific knowledge, and place less emphasis on meta-cognitive training, which is important if trainees are expected to interact with people from many different cultures . . . [m]oreover, the content of such training has typically focused on cultural values based on the assumption of a strong link between values and behavior, which can be overly simplistic current methods of cross-cultural learning rely substantially on analogical learning, which expect [*sp*] students to apply what they learn in class to the actual cross-cultural situations that they encounter. (Yee et al. 2005, 6)

There is clearly room to take the lessons learned to develop a more beneficial model for developing an organization's cultural intelligence. Clearly a simplistic "classroom-only" environment limits the benefit to those undergoing the education or training. The requirement for a multi-faceted approach is obvious.

Cultural intelligence is gained by the internalization of facts, concepts, and practices of different cultures. Building cultural intelligence requires far more than simply providing a training briefing to an individual about a culture prior to deployment. It requires a dedicated effort to broaden one's ability to become culturally intelligent through education, experience, and practice:

[All personnel] should receive cultural and language instruction, not to make every soldier a linguist but to make every soldier a diplomat with enough sensitivity and linguistic skills to understand and converse with the indigenous citizen on the street. The mission of acculturation is too important to be relegated to last-minute briefings prior to deployment. (Scales 2004)

To develop individuals that are prepared to successfully operate within foreign cultures required that the military provide the means for individuals to become culturally intelligent. The military must prepare them to project the necessary "finesse, diplomacy, and communication" to accomplish the mission in an often ambiguous environment (McFarland 2005, 62). To develop individuals that are prepared to successfully operate within foreign cultures requires that the military provide the means for individuals to become culturally intelligent.

¹Many of the non-military discussions refer to cultural intelligence in terms of "CQ," which depicts an individual's "cultural quotient." CQ in this sense is directly related to one's "IQ" combined with other attributes.

²The author identifies three parts of cultural awareness: knowledge, mindfulness, and behavioral skills.

³Anecdotal evidence points to an extreme knowledge of the enemy, wherein even individual Soviet commanders' personal information were available to NATO commanders. This suggests that Cold War-era commanders had a significant advantage over contemporary leaders. However, it also reveals the extreme differences between counter-terrorism / irregular warfare and conventional warfare.

CHAPTER 3

FUSION OF CORPORATE CONCEPT AND MILITARY DOCTRINE

Modern organizations operate in a thoroughly global environment. Not only do they buy and sell goods and services in several national markets, but they also hire individuals from a variety of cultures. As a result, culturally heterogeneous teams frequently determine strategy, undertake planning, carry out research, and perform other complex tasks for organizations. Team members with diverse cultural and functional backgrounds inevitably differ in their assumptions about decision-making and even in their preconceptions of teamwork. Some evidence indicates that traditional models of multicultural collaboration fail to draw most effectively on individual team members' skills and experiences.

—Kellog School of Management 2008

Research Design

This project was conducted in three phases. Initially, I collected the resources needed to obtain a baseline understanding of military and corporate doctrine along with academic knowledge and studies. Subsequently, I categorized the documents in terms of applicability to the U.S. military. Lastly, I queried experts, to include the authors of several references utilized for research, to confirm or deny conclusions, elaborate on concepts, and finalize the thesis. The integration of several distinct areas of expertise allowed a confluence of general concepts that can be molded together to identify an actual “cultural intelligence” learning process for the U.S. military. The most critical component is the fusion of best practices from each discipline.

Fusion is defined as “a merging of diverse, distinct, or separate elements into a unified whole” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2008). It is necessary to broaden the knowledge-base within the military to garner a feasible approach to develop cultural

intelligence. Similar to out-sourcing such tasks as recruiting, logistics, and human terrain team manning, the military must seek the best practices from the corporate and academic sectors to ensure fulfillment of cultural intelligence goals.

Maddy Janssens and Jeanne M. Brett relate that developing a cultural intelligence capability can be likened to fusion cooking. Fusion cooking “combines or substitutes ingredients or cooking techniques from different cultural traditions while preserving their distinct flavors, textures, and presentations” (Kellog School of Management 2008). At no point do the individual components of such cuisine lose their basic identity. Rather, the resultant dishes broadcast the uniqueness and desirability of the combined yet distinct ingredients. Cultural intelligence also requires the combination of distinctly different aspects of cultures. By educating individuals of the various aspects of a variety of cultures, the military will develop a better collective understanding of variables of which to be aware.

The development of cultural intelligence must be considered a sequential process, yet many of the levels overlap. For example, while an individual’s spoken language skills may be less developed, their ability to detect and understand non-verbal cues may be advanced. The various means of communication are important points to consider:

[T]he efficacy of communication depends upon using language to demonstrate one’s willingness to relate, which often involves the indirectness of politeness rather than the direct and “efficient” choice of language full of information. That ways of being polite vary from one language and culture to another is widely known, but this is often reduced to the acquisition of particular formulas. (Byram 1997, 3)

Even at the culmination of one level, a new level starts or continues, and must be considered as dependent on the others. Developing cultural intelligence must be viewed as a never-ending process that takes an individual from a lack of understanding to

increasing levels of understanding. It is a long-term process that must be considered a key component to the professional education system; it is not something that can be addressed solely as a pre-deployment task (Yee et al. 2005, 1-5). Consider the following passage that discusses a situation wherein methodology must be significantly modified:

An individual cannot expect to go deer hunting for the first time and expect to “bag a trophy buck.” This is particularly true if the same person has never studied the deer as a species, their habits, diet, defense mechanisms, mating behavior, or--most basically--the physical characteristics that differentiate the sexes. Someone that intends to harvest a “monster buck” must combine experience with education in order to become a true trophy hunter. As is implied, this is a long-term endeavor that is typically highlighted by continual learning and even periods of extreme frustration.

This metaphor may be more clearly understood in light of the GWOT, in which the quarry is not wild game, but continually adapting individuals and terrorist organizations--and populations--whose ability to modify behaviors based on a changing environment is far more rapid than the evolution of deer. Similar to the hunter that must master his quarry, modern military forces must master the enemy forces that they are charged with defeating, and the populations who support them must be won. This “exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation” is required for military operations (McFate and Jackson 2005, 18). The ability to develop cultural intelligence will allow U.S. forces to identify “centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities” for the application of both kinetic and non-kinetic measures (Porter n.d., 1).

The deer hunter and modern military practices metaphor becomes more complete if we reveal that the hunter has been an accomplished angler his entire life and is now transitioning to deer hunting. The learning curve is extremely steep and at times may appear insurmountable. Indeed, the developing hunter may apply lessons that he learned

with a completely different form of game in stalking his new prey. Like the hunter, military forces must make a significant transition in order to be successful. While this metaphor may seem logical, stalking game is far less complex than building partnerships. Stalking game can be considered completely self-centered to the hunter's needs and desires. In the international arena, military forces must also consider that even such concepts as relationship building and politeness can be combat multipliers. These attributes may provide a bridge between cultural tendencies that seem completely incompatible and potentially points of contention (Byram 1997, 3-4).

During the majority of the latter half of the twentieth century military specialists have perfected detecting and engaging primarily linear, conventional forces with sizeable "footprints" within the visual, measures, electronic, and signal disciplines of the intelligence world. These forces also represented *known* entities with established orders of battle and predictable tactics. All efforts were dedicated to analyzing numerical strength and capabilities of armored vehicles and aircraft, yield and quantity of nuclear weapons, movements of units, and identification of enemy intelligence capabilities and efforts.

The conclusion of the Cold War also affected the identity of nations. Countries generally allied themselves with the massive collective security bodies of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The aligned countries generally modeled their structures in accordance with the major power to which they were aligned. This all changed with the demise of the fault line between East and West. Nations began to "reconnect with their own cultural and social norms" (McFarland 2005, 62). While the world was clearly changing, much of the U.S. military did not make the same drastic reorientation.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, one maneuver commander stated that “[he] knew where every enemy tank was dug in . . . [the only] problem was [that his] soldiers had to fight fanatics. [He] had perfect situational awareness. What [he] lacked was cultural awareness. [There was great] technical intelligence [but the] wrong enemy” (Scales 2004). Obviously this commander mastered the traditional method for prosecuting conflict; however, he clearly lacked the cultural intelligence necessary for the contemporary battlefield (see table 3).

Table 3. Comparison of Requirements for Counterinsurgency vs. Conventional Combat Operations

Conventional Operations		Counterinsurgency
Physical Terrain	Battlespace Environment	Human Factors: Demographics, Culture, Tribes, Clans, Classes, Ethnicities, Key Individuals / Groups / Families
Politics not primarily considered	Battlespace Effects	Politics are central and integral for every action
Linear		Assymetric (computer, media-IO, population)
Effects of Physical Terrain and Weather		Effects of infrastructure, government services, jobs and media
Order of Battle	Threat Evaluation	Networks (cellular structure)
Doctrinal Templates		Enemy Tactics, Techniques, & Procedures
Military Focus (uniformed combatants, identifiable threat w/ large signature)		Irregular warfare threat requires distinguishing between insurgents, active / tactic supporters, and general population
Event Template (movement times / doctrine)	Threat Courses of Action	Pattern, link analysis, social networking, (objectives / goals)
Centralized C2		Decentralized Cellular Operations

Source: Daniel Villeneuve, “To Provide Focus: Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency,” *Canadian Army Journal* (Winter 2008): 69.

The modern battlefield requires a virtual complete reversal from looking for “big things” to seeking “little things” in order to defeat the enemy. In essence,

American defense [must] adapt from the previous ideological challenge of Soviet totalitarianism to new, less-predictable enemies that may or may not fight on conventional battlefields and hide in the hinterlands of the world where the languages spoken are rarely studied in the western world. (Porter n.d., 1)

In fact, the transition from “conventional”-type operations to irregular conflicts--which are far more sensitive with regards to knowing the difference between friend or foe and the resultant difficulties with lethal targeting--has been difficult because of an institutional “lack of cultural awareness by the military and from its failure to institutionalize cultural awareness as a part of its doctrine and training especially in intelligence” (Center for Advanced Defense Studies 2006). Essentially, the military must transition from “fishing” to “hunting”:

[The United States does not] understand how to counter enemy lies and propaganda [which is] one of our critical vulnerabilities because we are unable to prevent the attraction of suicide bomb recruits. With better knowledge of what motivates recruits, psychological operations and public diplomacy can directly challenge the ideology, delegitimizing it in the eyes of the eyes of the parents of teenage boys, thus capitalizing on one of [the enemy’s] critical vulnerabilities. (Porter n.d., 1-2)

The power that can be realized by intimately understanding the enemy--or any given target population--can enable the U.S. to engage both the enemy forces and the civilian population, because “success demands an understanding of individual, community, and societal normative patterns as they relate to the tasks soldiers perform and the environment in which they are performed” (McFarland 2005, 62). In essence, an “understanding of the host nation’s geography, history, tribal and sectarian concerns, economic system, infrastructure, and religion enables [freedom of maneuver] among the population [to accomplish the mission]” (Wojdakowski 2007, 1). Cultural intelligence

can actually assist a military commander during the planning and execution of a campaign.

For example, there are countless references to the failure of U.S. information operations to reach their target audiences. In fact, “[no] full-blown and coherent program of information control was established in Iraq” following the invasion; the subsequent dismantling of state-run media outlets and imposition of Pentagon-driven propaganda led to distrust by the Iraqi people (Goldstein 2008, 58-65). In contrast, indigenous media outlets flourished, spurred by U.S. official L. Paul Bremer’s pledge to full freedom of speech for the Iraqi people. This allowed extensive anti-Coalition and anti-liberal propaganda from often self-serving media sources, while the Coalition-led networks avoided “bad news” stories--common features included cooking shows, game shows, and an “American Idol”-inspired program (Goldstein 2008, 58-65).

Information operations did not receive the same level of attention in pre-OIF combat preparation as conventional operations including stability experience in the Balkans. The inability of U.S. forces to diverge from traditional military means of developing stability enabled insurgent groups to use “guile, subterfuge, and terror mixed with patience and a willingness to die” to offset technological advantages (Scales 2004). Fully developing the military’s CQ will facilitate the understanding--and potentially the anticipation--of our opponents and their ideologies; the same ideologies are “central to how [the enemy] perceives the United States and how [the enemy] is willing to fight” (Porter n.d., 2).

In order to make this transition the desired end state for military operations must be identified. In this sense the operations being conducted in the GWOT demand that the

military community identify individuals and small cells to enable the necessary engagements to occur (which may be either lethal or non-lethal) that may prevent excessive hostilities in the future. In many cases, these people and organizations are within indigenous populations that possess attributes alien to Western minds; U.S. military members find themselves “immersed in an alien culture unable to identify friend from foe or to identify those within the population they [can] trust” (Scales 2004). Therefore, the Western minds must develop the ability to achieve parity with local minds in order “to identify and understand the many complex relationships” that are present in an area (Wojdakowski 2007, 1).

A seasoned Israeli general officer commented to a Washington, D.C., audience that the “[U.S.] would not prevail against terrorists unless [Americans] understand their language, their literature, and their poetry” (Porter n.d., 4). Cultural intelligence has clear linkage to “mission success and mission effectiveness” in the contemporary operating environment and requires leaders capable of interpreting changing environments (Yee et al. 2005, 2). Confusion can easily result if an organization is not “tuned in” to the population that it is attempting to penetrate, especially when attempts are polluted by past practices, narrow thinking about cross-cultural interaction, or exclusive use of academic approaches (Thomas and Inkson 2005, 1-2).

The only present-day institution for such culturally-attuned personnel is the U.S. military Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program. According to U.S. Army doctrine,

Foreign Area Officers serve where expert Army officers are needed to match their professional military skills and knowledge with their regional expertise, language skills, and knowledge of US and foreign political-military relationships. The US Army serves the nation’s security interests in many vital areas of the world where U. S. troops are not stationed. In these areas, the Foreign Area Officers are our

forward-deployed forces. Foreign Area Officers serve worldwide as attaches, key security assistance officers, political-military policy staff officers, political-military intelligence staff officers, and political-military instructors. (U.S. Army 1987, 1)

These individuals are selected from basic specialties such as infantry, artillery, or armor, and permanently assigned to FAO positions. However, their preparation for this assignment is extensive. The “training consists of 6-18 months of language training, 12 months in-country training, and 12-18 months of graduate school” (Boraz 2005). These officers are further assigned to a regional specialty in which they continue their development and orientation. The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy recently energized a similar program within their services. The current war has heightened the awareness of the critical skills and duties provided by FAOs:

Their role is to use this unique combination of skills to support the warfighter and to advance U.S. interests. The FAO enhances the effectiveness of the Army while interacting with foreign militaries, as well as other government and civilian agencies and groups. A FAO’s regional knowledge and skills amplify and build upon the foundation of professional soldier skills, knowledge, experience, and values expected of all officers. (U.S. Army 2008)

Unfortunately, there is minimal spill-over effect or cross-pollination with the tactical military forces. Therefore, the potential benefits from the FAO program are reserved for the operational and strategic levels.

The U.S. military must embrace the changing nature of warfare in the 21st Century. International globalization has forced a similar change on the corporate world, and “[d]uring the past decade, corporations have learned the value of educating their employees . . . to ensure their subordinates are prepared intellectually to transition to new levels of responsibility” (Scales 2004). The U.S. health care system has also identified that it must be culturally attuned to meet the medical requirements of a very diverse U.S.

population (Yee et al. 2005, 1-5). Whereas corporations must intimately understand the demands of their customers, the contemporary operating environment displays that:

intimate knowledge of the enemy's motivation, intent, will, tactical method, and cultural environment has proved to be far more important for success than the deployment of smart bombs, unmanned aircraft, and expansive bandwidth. Success in [current operations] rests with the ability of leaders to think and adapt faster than the enemy and of soldiers to thrive in an environment of uncertainty, ambiguity, and unfamiliar cultural circumstances. (Scales 2004)

The military must adapt as a learning organization to the most likely threat by cultivating expertise and abandon "the premise that success in war is best achieved by overwhelming technological advantage" (Scales 2004). In fact, working with several other cultures "to achieve the same goal would be an important aspect of operational level leadership" (Yee et al. 2005, 2).

CHAPTER 4

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

The emerging importance of cultural identity and its inherent frictions make it imperative for soldiers and leader--military and civilian--to understand societal and cultural norms of populaces in which they operate and function. They must appreciate, understand, and respect those norms and use them as tools for shaping operations and the effects they expect to achieve.

—McFarland, 2005

The preceding chapters addressed the components of cultural intelligence. However, there is a need for institutional “leadership development programmes for cross-cultural leader competencies” (Yee et al. 2005, 2). This chapter will provide a possible methodology for developing this important capability within the services. The interconnected aspects of cultural intelligence necessitate a development strategy that addresses several areas. Developing cultural intelligence must be approached in a multifaceted strategy focused on education. The approach cannot be solely sequential, nor can it be simultaneous. Furthermore, development must continue throughout a lifetime to continue to hone and advance individual capabilities. Because the duration of development is so important, considerable thought must be given to initiating development during even pre-commissioning periods; the U.S. Military Academy even offers its cadets opportunities for sponsored travel abroad during breaks in the academic year. It may be wise to extend that opportunity to Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) personnel since that is the largest source of U.S. Army officers (McFarland 2005, 67). The military must actively pursue the development of personnel and

educate soldiers and leaders on foundational cultural norms and values and teach them skills used to understand and bridge cultural differences, looking at

religious, tribal, and nationalistic factors in representative and non representative societies. (McFarland 2005, 69)

Paramount is that an individual possesses the motivation to develop the knowledge and skills required for cultural intelligence (Byram 1997, 15-16). The specific areas of education that will be addressed in this chapter are institutional learning, personal development, interaction, and immersion. The earlier that this development begins, the greater the benefits to the organization; introduction at entry-level is a best case (Yee et al. 2005, 2).

A clear distinction must be made prior to further discussion. From a military standpoint, many efforts to improve performance are addressed through training. Training allows personnel to develop their performance in response to complex tasks. Many of these tasks require that personnel continually execute actions that develop into routine. These routines--similar to "muscle memory"--allow military personnel to operate in high-stress, often ambiguous environments, in a manner that can be deemed somewhat predictable. In addition, when such training is conducted it is intended to be universal, in essence it "places the onus on the organization" rather than "[shifting] the responsibility to individuals" (Yee et al. 2005, 6).

The training approach cannot be completely discounted. There is some merit to exposing personnel to the nuances of foreign cultures. However, training must be considered as a most basic building block, from which personnel can truly initiate their cultural intelligence education. There is also benefit in training when it is a collaborative environment that allows the application of skills developed through education.

The training approach--such as "cultural awareness" training--is clearly better than no preparation whatsoever. In fact, there is merit to the general subject areas

address. Once again, the general topics covered by cultural awareness training, provides an excellent starting point:

1. the history of the local area (country), and the origins of conflicts
 2. components of culture, values, traditions and beliefs in the area (religion, education and economic activity)
 3. language training
 4. physical geography, climate, topography, economic patterns
 5. cultural personality including education, family size, ethics and values
 6. study of anthropology of the other countries
 7. understanding cultural differences--knowing how one's own culture affects someone else's culture can affect the mission's chances of success
 8. educating soldiers and leaders on foundational cultural norms and values and teaching them skills used to understand and bridge cultural differences (Yee et al. 2005).
- Unfortunately this limits an individual's knowledge to what they are lectured about during often compressed and limited training periods; it may be likened to "drinking from a fire hose" because an individual can only absorb a finite amount of information at a time. However, if these topics are expanded into an actual curriculum that spans an appropriate time period, a higher level of knowledge--and perhaps expertise--is possible.

The combination of intelligence quotient and emotional quotient is critical for an individual to develop cultural intelligence. Intelligence is required for an individual to both understand complex subjects and be capable of learning new ideas. Emotional intelligence is necessary for people to be open to learning new ideas, willingness to interact with new people and cultures, and the ability to embrace sometimes confusing

environments. Previous publications identified three broad categories for cross-cultural training methods:

1. Factual: area briefings, lectures, books
2. Analytical: classroom, language training, case studies, culture assimilators, sensitivity training
3. Experiential: interactive language training, role plays, field trips, and simulations (Yee et al. 2005, 4).

The three categories serve as a basis for application in the U.S. military. They can each be accomplished through civilian and military educational institutions with readily available resources. However, the potential for the U.S. military to provide global reach to service members adds a fourth area to facilitate cultural intelligence development. The potential to send service members to overseas locations where they can actually immerse in a foreign culture provides the final component to preparation. With the introduction of overseas travel, the modification of the previous list allows four key areas to achieving cultural intelligence (each will be discussed in more detail later): institutional learning, personal development, interaction, and immersion (see figure 6).




Figure 6. Integrated CQ Development Strategy

Acquiring cultural intelligence requires that each component be addressed in its development. As mentioned in earlier chapters, intelligence and emotional quotients are key components. Likewise, personal experiences and a desire to learn provide critical aspects. These provide the components of the “training needs.”

1. Meta-cognition: mental processes that individuals use to acquire and understand cultural knowledge
2. Cognition: general knowledge and knowledge structures about culture
3. Motivation: direction of energy toward learning about and functioning in cross-cultural situations
4. Behavior: capability to exhibit appropriate verbal and non-verbal actions when interacting with people from different cultures (Yee et al. 2005, 5-8).

Therefore, a training model must be utilized that pays proper attention to each of these critical components (see figure 7).




Figure 7. Modified CQ-Based Training Framework

Source: Ng Kok Yee, Regena Ramaya, Teo Tony M.S., and Wong Siok Fun, *Cultural Intelligence: Its Potential for Military Leadership Development* (Singapore: International Military Testing Association, 2005), 8.

The corporate and academic worlds have distinct advantages regarding the level of cultural intelligence in their organizations. The universal goal for developing cultural intelligence is the ability to “[build] relationships, [value] people of different cultures, [listen and observe], [cope] with ambiguity, [translate] complex information, [take] action and initiative, [manage] others, adaptability/flexibility, and [manage] stress” (Yee et al. 2005).

While the military must generally “grow its own” experts, commercial organizations can do a careful selection of their employees prior to employment. Civilian ventures can review resumes and conduct interviews to determine potential in these areas.

Furthermore, they can select for positions as needed and presumably have less stringent hiring constraints. Businesses and universities can selectively hire individuals based on need; the military must primarily mobilize existing personnel to meet needs. But they also offer potential opportunities for the U.S. military to embrace their practices by “leverage[ing] business and industry programs for cultural education, making them available through distributed learning” (McFarland 2005, 67).

In realizing that the contemporary operating environment demands diverse leaders, “the selection and training of ‘transculturals’ [is] one of the challenges facing the U.S. Army Leadership in the future (and current) military operating context.” Such “transcultural skills” encompass the ability to “transcend cultural differences and bridge cultural gaps within and beyond their own military forces” (Yee et al. 2005). The foundation for developing one’s cultural competency is cultural and linguistic knowledge, and the skills that reduce uncertainty in foreign environments (Byram 1997, 15-16).

Institutional Learning

The basis for developing basic knowledge on any subject is academic study. The primary method for furthering intelligence is instruction in a myriad of disciplines. Institutional learning facilitates an individual’s development by offering academic experts that provide targeted instruction on a particular subject. When education is conducted in a variety of environments it also adds to the benefit of educational programs.

The majority of military-sponsored education is conducted at military educational institutions. While this is better than no formal education at all, attention must be

devoted to broadening the military's knowledge base at civilian institutions as well. The military is a culture unto itself, with a definitive separation from the majority of American culture. Those personnel selected to attend "civilian" educational institutions will interact with the diverse society that is present. That in itself will diversify the military member's social exposure and develop a societal-internal degree of cultural intelligence. Military personnel that attend civilian institutions will gain a completely different perspective than those restricted to military schools. Furthermore, there is enormous potential for the civilian population to gain a better understanding of the military.

The importance of communication necessitates an emphasis in scholastics, during which "[t]he early focus . . . should be more on effective use and application of language than on making a soldier a linguist" (McFarland 2005, 66). There are two distinct considerations for training individuals to communicate in foreign lands. First is the spoken language, which allows people to relay their thoughts and ideas. Of equal importance is non-verbal communications such as gestures or physical expressions: "To tie an Arab's hands while he is speaking . . . is tantamount to tying his tongue" (Barakat 1973).

There are several additional subject areas to consider when developing a more culturally intelligent individual. The social sciences are critical to understanding a foreign culture; they are also critical to understanding one's own. In order to learn about foreign culture, it is critical for an individual to understand their own.

Cultural norms are so strongly ingrained in daily life that individuals might be unaware of certain behaviors. Until they see such behaviors in the context of a

different culture with different values and beliefs, they might have difficulty recognizing and changing them. (McFarland 2005, 66)

Aside from the social sciences, some effort must be dedicated to developing negotiating skills. Different cultures react in various ways to specific negotiating techniques. If an individual understands a variety of negotiation techniques, then along with their cultural intelligence will be more likely to apply the most effective method.

Personal Development

An individual must have a genuine interest in order to truly internalize a subject. Therefore, a self-driven personal development plan that includes study of various cultures' literature, social structures, history, religion, economic factors, political science, laws, and geography. There is increased benefit if this self-development can be conducted using regional languages. As an individual's cultural intelligence increases, this is a logical progression that should be sought after.

One of the more developed personal aspects discussed earlier was prejudice. Individuals must learn what stereotypes exist and the prejudices that they personally possess in order to avoid them in the future. Military leaders must understand their own capabilities and limitations because "they must understand and appreciate their own military culture, their nation's culture, and their operational area's culture" (McFarland 2005, 64).

Interaction

No amount of institutional learning or personal development can thoroughly prepare an individual to interact with foreign cultures. There must be some exposure to foreign peoples. A successful example of this is at many of the U.S. military service

schools. For example, at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, a significant portion of the student body are international students representing dozens of countries. These officers interact constantly with their American counterparts in both classroom and social settings. Aside from the strategic benefits of these relationships, many friendships bloom and offer potential future contact.

There must also be more focus on providing similar “exchange” opportunities to U.S. officers to attend Foreign Service schools. The U.S. Army currently offers extremely limited opportunities for personnel to receive their Professional Military Education requirements abroad. In addition, the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College regularly sends students to Foreign Service schools for short-duration exchanges in order to meet professional military education requirements. This is clearly better than nothing; however, the affected populations are extremely small because the selection criterion is limited. For example, the 2008 exchange with Australia only included 10 officers. Other exchanges represented a similar ratio to traditional U.S. allies; this extremely limits the population that actually conducts U.S. government-sponsored inter-cultural opportunities. By expanding the eligibility for such programs the military can greatly increase both its CQ and inter-cultural reach.

Tactical military forces occasionally also have the opportunity to conduct operations with allies or partnership nations. Multi-national exercises offer an excellent means of exposure to different cultures. Unfortunately, the relationships are often short-term or only for the duration of the exercise. Furthermore, unless personnel are afforded the opportunity to truly interact--meals, celebrations, even shopping trips--the benefits are marginalized. However, it is a clear means to increase some level of cultural intelligence.

The various combat training centers also offer exposure to foreign cultures. Although at times choreographed, the concept has excellent application to individuals developing their cultural intelligence. Furthermore, the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College involves foreign-national instructors in some regional studies classes. The instructors provide not only language and cultural instruction, but serve as facilitators in practical exercises involving students role-playing as tribal leaders including the use of regional languages. The introduction of this method of teaching to more of the student body must be considered.

A significant negative aspect of foreign participation in U.S. activities--and not maximizing reciprocal exchanges--is that the exchanges tend to “[educate] the foreign student about U.S. cultural norms than the inverse” (McFarland 2005, 64). While the military is extremely extended in current operations, consideration must be given to future tribulations. More U.S. military personnel must be placed in liaison or exchange positions to build the collective CQ.

Immersion

A final aspect to consider is actual immersion in a foreign society. This would entail an individual actually living within a foreign society, with limited-to-no contact with other expatriates on a regular basis. An example may be individuals selected to study abroad through the Olmstead Scholarship program. This program,

offers educational grants for two years of graduate study in a foreign language and other educational experiences in a foreign country to competitively selected career line officers from the four branches of the U.S. military. . . for advanced education and to increase their sensitivity to the languages, interests, viewpoints, cultures, histories, and concerns of people around the world. (The George and Carol Olmsted Foundation n.d.)

The expansion of such a program would be beneficial for countless mid-grade officers. Of note, the U.S. Army has already expanded the opportunities for this demographic to pursue graduate studies at government expense. Including the ability to pursue such an education in a foreign culture is an excellent opportunity to improve CQ at minimal additional expense to the organization.

There are limited opportunities for U.S. military personnel to participate in exchange programs with allied nations. This forces an American to function in a strange environment and to use all of the knowledge gained. The application of all previous efforts while immersed in foreign cultures allows further tuning of cultural intelligence. The goal for immersion in a foreign society is to apply the knowledge learned during education, personal development, and interaction, but more importantly “to learn from . . . overseas experiences” (Yee et al. 2005, 7).

There are a myriad of factors to consider when determining an individual’s potential for cultural awareness development. This is the critical component of personal experience that impacts an individual’s cultural intelligence. Considerations may include social background, marital status, parenthood, or relations with foreign nationals. Likewise an individual’s temperament is an important consideration when considering which personnel to interact with foreign populations.

While the amount of development is important, there is a final consideration of judging a serviceman’s CQ. The vast resources expended in training, education, and deployment must be reflected in some type of rubric that identifies gains (or perhaps losses). This is perhaps the most difficult aspect of cultural intelligence development, and may be far more subjective than subjects such as mathematics or training standards

such as basic rifle marksmanship. A possible solution for both self-assessment and institutional assessment is shown in table 4.

Table 4. Continuum of Progress: Evaluating CQ

Indicator	Novice	Basic	Proficient	Advanced
Awareness of culture	Students are largely ignorant of specific value systems that contribute to how they and others behave, OR they possess negative, stereotyped beliefs about different cultural groups.	Students are aware that culture affects their own and others' behavior; however, understanding specific beliefs and value systems is largely superficial or incomplete.	Students possess some knowledge of specific beliefs, values, and sensibilities that contribute to the way they and others behave.	Students are highly knowledgeable about specific cultural beliefs, values, and sensibilities that might affect the way they and others think or behave.
Awareness of history and its impact	Students are largely unknowledgeable about their own and others' histories, cultures, and they show no interest in learning more.	Students possess basic knowledge about history, mostly focused on mainstream American cultures. They are largely unaware of how history has shaped relationships among diverse groups.	Students know some history of mainstream and nonmainstream American cultures and that of other nations; they understand these histories affect relationships today, but their understanding is unsophisticated.	Students have substantial knowledge of both history of both mainstream and nonmainstream American cultures and the history of other nations. They have a sophisticated understanding of how these histories have affected relationships among groups.
Perspective taking; history	Students do not realize knowledge of history is socially and politically constructed; when learning about history they do not independently assume the perspective of the nonmainstream groups.	Students require substantial assistance to recognize that knowledge of history is socially constructed and to assume the perspective of nonmainstream groups when learning history.	Students realize history is socially constructed. With minimal guidance they can take the perspective of nonmainstream groups when learning about historical events.	Students realize history is socially and politically constructed, and students have sufficient knowledge to spontaneously take the perspective of nonmainstream groups when learning history.
Stereotyping and bias	Students do not understand that stereotyping and other biases are not acceptable and tend to engage in these behaviors. Students internalize implicit, biased messages about other cultural groups (for example, in the media).	At a general level, students understand that stereotyping and other biases are not acceptable; however, they are not sensitive to the impact of prejudice or to biased messages about other cultural groups (for example, in the media).	Students understand the dangers of stereotyping and other biases; they are aware of and sensitive to issues of racism and prejudice and sometimes recognize biased messages about other cultural groups (for example, in the media).	Students understand the dangers of stereotyping and other biases; are sensitive to issues of racism and prejudice; and are highly cognizant of biased messages about other cultural groups (for example, in the media).

Tolerance	Students fail to recognize the similarities between their own culture and that of others; they judge differences in behavior or lifestyle negatively and do not associate with individuals from different cultures.	With few exceptions, students fail to recognize similarities between their own and others' cultures. Although not negative about differences in behavior or lifestyle, students only occasionally associate with individuals from different cultures.	With guidance, students are cognizant of similarities between their own and others' cultures. They appreciate and accept individuals with diverse beliefs, appearances, and lifestyles.	Students understand individuals from diverse cultures share some fundamental beliefs; they appreciate and accept diversity and seek opportunities to learn about and interact with different cultures.
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Source: Maxie McFarland, "Military Cultural Education," *Military Review* (March-April 2005): 68

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Soldiers are the centerpiece of The Army's formation--not equipment. And Soldiers of the Objective Force will leverage dominant knowledge to gain decision superiority over any adversary. They will seamlessly integrate Objective Force capabilities with the capabilities of joint forces, Special Operations Forces, other federal agencies, and multinational forces. The Objective Force Soldiers will enable the United States to achieve its national security goals in a crisis, rather than simply inflict punitive strikes on an adversary.

—U.S. Army

The evidence identifies that (1) the contemporary operating environment requires personnel that are culturally intelligent; (2) the U.S. military, while making definite attempts to gain cultural intelligence, lacks this attribute as an institution; (3) there are successful methods--although not necessarily military-oriented--of developing a more culturally intelligent organization. Therefore, the U.S. military must adapt to the world's requirements and, using available resources, create an internal cultural intelligence capability.

The Global War on Terror has identified major shortcomings in the U.S. military's ability to operate successfully in diverse cultures. In particular, the U.S. military failed to heed and understand the social norms and values of both Iraqi and Afghan culture. This failure caused a definitive rift between Coalition Forces and each nation's population. While this may not have facilitated the insurgency it was certainly involved in creating some degree support for insurgents.

Developing and cultivating a cultural intelligence capability within the U.S. military promises to provide a means to penetrate the wall between exogenous forces and

the local populace. The culturally intelligent force will act in ways more acceptable to regional norms and, therefore, develop a positive rapport. In future conflicts the early acquisition of rapport may promise to either smother an insurgency in its infancy or at least deny much of its maneuver space.

An added benefit to a more culturally intelligent military is it promises to transform from “the Ugly American” to “the American Friend.” This process may be slow and incremental; however, it is necessary in the globalized world. Similar to an oil stain, a positive international opinion of Americans will continue to spread. Because the military is often the most visible ambassador of the United States in the international arena, it is prudent that steps be undertaken to transform into a culturally intelligent force.

The U.S. military currently attempts to minimize the impact of cultural ignorance by conducting rudimentary “Cultural Awareness” training. This training is largely a stop-gap measure that is often under-resourced and poorly conducted. In addition much of this training is rushed during pre-deployment windows so that the information retained by the average soldier is minimal. Lastly, this training is often very broadly focused and may--or may not--have application in the actual area of deployment.

The only dedicated specialty career field in the military for culture experts is the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) corps. These specialists rarely are incorporated into tactical units and are rather employed at the operational and strategic levels. The other attempt to bridge cultural gaps is the Human Terrain Teams, which provide both civilian and military personnel to brigades on an *ad hoc* basis.

The U.S. military can internally improve its ability to prepare units for deployment by increasing its leaders’ and soldiers’ cultural intelligence. The emphasis

on cultural intelligence must be institutionalized and incorporated into the career paths of professional soldiers. The best-case scenario has this development starting early in careers--perhaps even pre-commissioning for officers--and continue throughout a career. This creates a widespread cultural intelligence capability that will permeate the military at all levels. The initial focus on the individual provides ever-increasing numbers until cultural intelligence becomes a whole-military trait.

There are many models and best practices available from both corporate and academic organizations that provide a framework for instituting a method for developing cultural intelligence. These models are easily transferable to the military although there will undoubtedly be changes and command emphasis required.

The initial consideration must be on developing language capabilities as a proven key to culture. Therefore, personnel must develop proficiency in foreign language to gain cultural intelligence. Effort must be devoted to not only developing a linguistic capability but also to understanding the nuances of both verbal and non-verbal communication; essentially developing “interpreters” rather than “translators.” The measure of effectiveness is someone that cannot only read, write, and verbally communicate, but also sense the environment of an exchange.

In lieu of a large investment in a dedicated military institution that enhances cultural intelligence, the military can build upon practices currently in use. The U.S. Military Academy offers opportunities for cadets to study abroad; perhaps similar opportunities can be afforded to contracted Reserve Officers Training Corps cadets. This ensures that the development of CQ begins at the earliest opportunity and synchronizes the capabilities of the Officer Corps. This opportunity may picque the interest of

otherwise ignorant or hesitant individuals, and makes them increasingly comfortable while operating in foreign environments.

At more senior levels, the FAO program incorporates academic studies, language studies, and immersion in foreign cultures to develop warrior-diplomats. The U.S. Army also recently expanded eligibility for graduate school programs for many junior officers, and the Olmsted Scholarship program finances graduate-level education for a select number of serving military officers. Combining portions of both programs has terrific potential. Further developing the expanded graduate school program to include mandatory cultural studies--and study abroad opportunities--promise to develop culturally intelligent personnel.

The aforementioned programs may be refined to provide the means for more military personnel to develop their cultural intelligence capabilities. By combining the opportunity to attend government-funded graduate school with the academic institutions traditionally affiliated with the Olmsted Scholarship Program, along with foreign language studies available at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, there is a ready-made solution for providing officers both the academic and cultural immersion requirements of cultural intelligence.

The military can increase its collective CQ by providing personnel the opportunity and means to develop intellectually. Development and improvement of CQ occurs by academic learning (in both cultural and language studies), personal development, interaction, and immersion. The four components to developing CQ must be considered perpetual and continued throughout a career. They must be addressed early--and addressed often-- to ensure individual growth. Opportunities for development

must be maximized both while assigned to troop units and during periods of non-troop duty (such as during advanced civil schooling, liaison assignments, or other non-traditional assignments.

There is credence to the idea that an individual who is proficient in more than one language is more likely to learn another. Perhaps the same is true for CQ, and once an individual learns to identify nuances in more than one culture they have the proclivity to gain proficiency in other cultures. Therefore maximizing the opportunities for personnel to gain cultural awareness in one culture will increase their chances for success in another culture.

The emphasis on developing cultural intelligence does not rest solely on individuals. While it is true that units increase cultural awareness based on the abilities of assigned personnel, it is important that organizational cultural awareness be addressed. The Cold War provided frequent opportunities for units from various NATO partners to interact and interoperate on a fairly regular basis. The multi-national requirements of facing the Warsaw Pact in Germany or the North Korean Peoples Army on the Korean peninsula facilitated the development of cross-cultural understanding.

The increasing pace of withdrawal of U.S. forces from bases abroad limits the opportunities for today's military to replicate the Cold War-era experiences. However, it is feasible to continue unit exchanges and multi-national training opportunities to foster the development of cultural intelligence and strengthen alliances. While there are clearly many nations involved in the GWOT, the level of interaction between U.S. and other forces is limited.

The focus on intellectual development is critical to developing the mentality of the U.S. military as a “learning organization.” The tendency of the military to embrace past successes such as the victory in the Second World War or Desert Storm complicates making necessary modifications to its *modus operandi*. Furthermore, executive leadership earned their positions from adherence to strict doctrinal models focused on “conventional” battlefield requirements. These leaders succeeded on proven models and may see divergence from such methods as unnecessary or undesirable.

Yet the modern battlefield requires flexible leaders that can adroitly adjust the organizational focus. Legacy systems simply may not apply in conflicts wherein the military operates among populations with global real-time communications capabilities. The impacts of actions are therefore not only felt locally but internationally. This necessitates that the U.S. military be a true learning organization to preserve both local opinion and international clout.

Policy and procedural change must be executed from the senior leadership. To change the fundamental focus of the military educational system requires that command emphasis be placed on developing the appropriate systems and programs. In the late 1980s, following several troubled “joint” operations, the U.S. Congress drove such change with the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act. This much-resisted attempt to force interoperability among the military services has only recently come to fruition with GWOT operations.

While an act of Congress would surely force a modification to current institutional practices, it is not guaranteed. However, the eventual progression of today’s junior- and mid-grade officers to executive positions provides a sure potential for change

(although the benefits will not be visible for a decade or more based on promotion timelines). Enough of these individuals have experience in the complicated environment currently faced by military forces. They not only see the impact of concepts such as the “strategic corporal,” but they also understand why incidents occur. Therefore, their close connection to this cause-effect relationship ensures that their lessons will endure throughout their careers.

It seems that change is more foreseeable in the distant future rather than the present . . . but not necessarily. Significant numbers of personnel have developed high levels of cultural intelligence through advanced civil schooling, exchange programs, and other experiences. These individuals must actively project their skills and share the benefits with subordinates, peers, and senior officers. Likewise, publication of endeavors promises to reach a much wider audience. Continued successes by culturally intelligent personnel may serve to create the desired “oil spot” theory for the military as a whole, developing the needed buy in from executive leadership.

Military transformation does not exclusively include the acquisition of new technology or changing tables of organization and equipment. It must also include transformation of thought and practice. The contemporary operating environment requires the ability of the military to culturally maneuver as proficiently as it tactically maneuvers. To achieve this proficiency requires that significant emphasis be placed on developing the cultural intelligence of the force. To ignore this key component of the modern battlefield is akin to taking a knife to a gunfight.

The ambiguity of the global war on terror can be overcome and victory achieved through an investment in the cultural intelligence of the U.S. military. Foremost in

insuring victory is for the military to understand not only the physical characteristics of a contemporary operating environment, but also less-apparent cultural and social perspectives. This will create the ability to identify requirements and issue appropriate orders because “[c]ultural literacy and competency skills will enable us to cope with most any circumstance of cultural difference” (McFarland 2005, 67).

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